“From JH to JUST: A Change in the Unified Theory Language Game”
By Dr. Gregg Henriques and Dr. Joseph Michalski
Posted December 1, 2018
Those familiar with the unified theory know that the Justification Hypothesis is a central idea that provides a framework for the evolution of human consciousness and culture and the behavior of persons. It has been developed in the literature by several different authors and even has been the source of some controversy in terms of the originality of the core idea. Despite this established record, a series of exchanges between myself and the coauthor of this blog, Dr. Joe Michalski, followed by a fortuitous reminder described below, have resulted in our mutual agreement that the Justification Hypothesis should be changed to Justification Systems Theory (abbreviated JUST). There are several good reasons for the change.
First, though, let’s briefly review the framework. What used to be called the JH, but that we will now be calling “JUST,” consists of three separable and yet intimately related “key ideas.” The first is an idea about the evolution of both human consciousness and language-based culture, as well as the adaptive selection pressures that contributed to their evolution. Specifically, we suggest that the evolution of symbolic language afforded a new window into human subjectivity, which in turn created the adaptive problem of social justification. Ultimately, because of language, humans became the first animal in history that had to explain and justify to others why they did what they did. This new adaptive problem was a game changer in terms of human social behavior and the nature of human consciousness. The second key idea is about the structure and functional arrangement of human consciousness. Specifically, we favor an “updated tripartite model” that includes an experiential consciousness that is contained within a person, a private narrator that engages in self-talk, and a public self that is projected and shared with others. Based on the first idea, we can predict and explain the psychodynamics of human consciousness in terms of tensions and filtering processes that take place between these domains. Most people are familiar with the tension associated with making private thoughts public (all of our efforts to lie, deceive, make things confidential, and so forth are examples of such filtering). Of course, Freud became famous because he saw the dynamics of how we humans can filter between our subconscious (experiential) and self-conscious systems of awareness. Although he was wrong about many specifics, he got the basic psychodynamic structure correct—our self-consciousness system does indeed operate as a filter relative to subconscious processes.
The third key idea is about the structure and functional arrangement of human culture and the nature of personhood. Specifically, human culture is characterized by the unified theory as large-scale systems of justification (Shaffer 2008). Justification systems refer to interlocking networks of linguistically represented beliefs and values that coordinate human action by intersubjectively framing both what is and what ought to be. Similarly, the fundamental or defining feature of “personhood” consists of being a being that self-reflects and legitimizes one’s actions in social contexts where the individual is held responsible for those actions.
With this backdrop, let’s explain why the JH is a misnomer and the name needs to be changed. First, the Justification Hypothesis proper refers only to the first key idea. It is a hypothesis in the sense that it is based on our evolutionary past and because it involves “conjecture” that cannot be confirmed directly. We can make predictions based on the JH (and Gregg has) and develop powerful logic to support the idea theoretically, but we will never be able to go back in time and empirically examine or test the process formally. This is in direct contrast to other key ideas that make up the framework. We can observe them in the here and now.
In fact, the models of human consciousness and human culture as justification systems are not really even appropriately described as “theories.” They offer us instead ways of seeing and describing human consciousness and culture. The idea that verbal behaviors are organized functionally in a way that legitimizes claims and actions has been “seen” by folks as divergent in their thinking as the radical behaviorist B. F. Skinner (who was concerned with the contingences of verbal behavior) and social constructionists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (who delineated how social reality is constructed via a set of legitimizing notions and practices). It is useful to put these ideas together and call them Justification Systems Theory. What JUST does differently than any other framework is provide a metatheoretical perspective that integrates many lines of thought to tell a clear and coherent narrative about how we moved from social primates and became modern cultured peoples.
I (Henriques) liked the Justification Hypothesis and came to name it that because it captured the essence of the uniqueness of the idea. It matches the current reality to our adaptive past in a powerful “lock and key” fashion. However, Joe started making a convincing case about six months ago and I could see that it was not quite right. The tipping point for me came when I was reviewing some old notes and I realized there was a time when I referred to the idea as either the “Justification Theory” or “Justification Systems Theory.” For example, here is the earliest Tree of Knowledge System which I sketched in 1997. In it the idea is characterized as “Justification Theory.”
Our dialogue – the interchange of ideas from two different “people” with different social locations or positions – proved essential to the further development of the framework. In particular, as I (Joe) delved more deeply into Gregg’s work, I have become more and more convinced that it offers a unique and powerful way to see the world and organize the sciences. As a sociologist, I have been impressed by how human social processes and forces can be understood as structured and functionally organized by justification systems. Although I have loved the framework, I was never really favored calling it a “hypothesis.” My scientific training has persuaded me to think differently about the nature of hypotheses and, in familiarizing myself with Gregg’s work, I realized the framework as a whole isn’t a hypothesis at all. Rather, it is a here-and-now and comprehensive summary set of claims about human behavior, selfconsciousness, and culture. Yes, the first part technically is about our evolutionary past, but the main insights apply to our current empirical human world. In fact, these ideas are even more concrete than a “theory,” but really can be thought of as a description. For example, Gregg’s justification systems are very similar to what Ludwig Wittgenstein called “language games.” For all these reasons, the concept of “hypothesis” simply does not communicate adequately the nature of the idea.
In talking with Gregg about his justification for the word “hypothesis,” I learned the history and why he came to use the term. I also learned that Gregg was sort of playing with us. By calling it a “hypothesis,” Gregg was issuing a kind of challenge to “not see” the claim. In other words, it can be thought of as a kind of “undersell” that creates a strange loop of confirmation. As you try to “disconfirm” the hypothesis, you realize that you are engaged in a process of justification that confirms it. Although that is an interesting feature of the name for those who want to learn the unified theory from an “insider baseball” viewpoint, the fact of the matter is that it isn’t all that helpful, encouraging or clear for folks who are just starting to get familiar with the idea.
I think that the focus should start with describing justification processes and structures. When we start there, we see these structures and processes all around us. And it is truly remarkable that, given how obvious and familiar they are, that they really have not been defined clearly before. Not only that, but we can also use the frame to see what others have seen. We can now understand that what Skinner called verbal behaviors are really processes of justification. We can also see that what Berger and Luckmann described as “the social construction of (human) reality” actually refer to systems of justification. Such systems range in scope from the individual level (when a person talks privately to oneself) to the dyadic level (a conversation) to the group level (e.g., as when preacher gives a Sunday sermon), and, finally, to the large-scale level of nations, political, or religious systems (e.g., the American legal system, a religion like Christianity, or the institution of science). Emphasizing these connections is the way to make the idea “pop” and not get bogged down in the layered complexity of Gregg’s system too early. After all, for those who are familiar with it, it is already complex enough! Anyway, for all these reasons, I strongly support the shift from labeling the metatheoretical framework Justification Systems Theory or JUST, rather than the Justification Hypothesis.
I (Gregg) thank Joe for his clear justification for why the change should be made. Although it is engrained in my consciousness in the form of “the JH,” it nevertheless is clear to me that such a change would be for the better. As such, let’s let go of the JH as the broad term and have it refer only to the first idea. Moving forward, we now have JUST as our new way of referring to the totality of this important metatheoretical framework.